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assignmentutor-lab™ 为您的留学生涯保驾护航 在代写博弈论Game Theory方面已经树立了自己的口碑, 保证靠谱, 高质且原创的统计Statistics代写服务。我们的专家在代写博弈论Game Theory代写方面经验极为丰富，各种代写博弈论Game Theory相关的作业也就用不着说。

• Statistical Inference 统计推断
• Statistical Computing 统计计算
• Advanced Probability Theory 高等概率论
• Advanced Mathematical Statistics 高等数理统计学
• (Generalized) Linear Models 广义线性模型
• Statistical Machine Learning 统计机器学习
• Longitudinal Data Analysis 纵向数据分析
• Foundations of Data Science 数据科学基础

## 经济代写|博弈论代写Game Theory代考|The Hawk-Dove Game

Contests between opponents over a resource do not always result in all-out fights. For instance, contests between male field crickets tend to follow a stereotyped escalating sequence of behaviours, where antennal fencing and mandible spreading, with no physical contact, appear early in aggressive interactions. Rillich et al. (2007) estimated that more than $35 \%$ of contests between size-matched males ended without any physical interaction, with the remainder progressing to mandible engagement and grappling. In some contests, however, the probability of serious or even fatal injury can be high. In male bowl and doily spiders, who fight by intense grappling, Austad (1983) recorded as many as $70 \%$ of staged fights between size-matched opponents that ended with serious injury.

In their classic paper, Maynard Smith and Price (1973) presented a model that aimed to show that even when population members have effective weaponry, limited fighting can be evolutionarily stable. In his book Maynard Smith (1982) gave a simplified version of this model. In the model two opponents pair up in order to contest a resource of value $V$ (i.e. gaining the resource increments reproductive success by $V$ ). All the usual simplifying assumptions listed in Section 3.1, such as simultaneous choice and symmetry apply. In the game an individual takes one of two actions, labelled Hawk and Dove. If both take action Hawk the pair fight; each wins this fight with probability one half, with the winner gaining the resource and the loser paying a cost $C$ due to injury incurred (i.e. future reproductive success is decreased by $C$ due to injury). If one contestant takes action Hawk and the other takes Dove, the Hawk attacks and the Dove runs away, leaving the resource to the Hawk. If both take action Dove, they display to each other (at no cost), and each gains the resource with probability one half. These payoffs are summarized in Table 3.2. As we will see, model predictions depend on whether the value of the resource, $V$, exceeds the cost of injury, $C$. For some biological scenarios it seems reasonable that $VC$.

## 经济代写|博弈论代写Game Theory代考|Lethal Fighting

The Hawk-Dove game is a highly idealized model of animal contests, but there are situations it describes rather well. Thus, it can be a reasonable model of highly dangerous fighting, where the cost is serious injury or even death.

Suppose that the winner of a contest has an immediate gain $V$ in reproductive success but the loser of a Hawk-Hawk fight dies. Then the expected total future reproductive success of a mutant playing $p^{\prime}$ when the resident plays $p$ is $W\left(p^{\prime}, p\right)=$ $A\left(p^{\prime}, p\right) V+S\left(p^{\prime}, p\right) W_{0}$, where $A\left(p^{\prime}, p\right)=\frac{1}{2}\left(1-p^{\prime}\right)(1-p)+p^{\prime}(1-p)+\frac{1}{2} p^{\prime} p$ is the probability the mutant wins the contest, $S\left(p^{\prime}, p\right)=1-\frac{1}{2} p^{\prime} p$ is the probability it survives the contest, and $W_{0}$ is the mutant’s future reproductive success given that it survives. Thus
$$W\left(p^{\prime}, p\right)=W_{0}+\frac{1}{2}(1-p) V+\frac{1}{2}(V-p C) p^{\prime},$$
where $C=W_{0}$. This is in the form of eq (3.4) except there is an additive constant $W_{0}$ that does not affect the stability analysis. The cost of dying is $C=W_{0}$ because the cost of death is the loss of future reproductive success. It follows that if $W_{0}$ is smaller than or comparable with the contested value $V$, the Evolutionarily Stable Strategy (ESS) is either pure Hawk $(V \geq C)$ or a high probability $p^{*}=V / C$ of playing Hawk.

This situation, with a small value $W_{0}$ of the future, occurs in nature. Among the best-studied examples are wingless males in some species of non-pollinating fig wasps (Fig. 3.6). These males develop in a fig fruit and, because they are wingless, can only mate with local females. If few females lay eggs in a fruit, there will be few females developing there, and few possibilities for future reproductive success for males that fight over access to females. From the simplified analysis of the Hawk-Dove game, we would then expect more injuries in male-male contests in fig wasp species where few females develop in a fruit. This was found to be the case in a study by West et al. (2001), comparing many fig wasp species, as seen in panel (a) of Fig. 3.6. Panel (b) shows the powerful mandibles of a wingless fig wasp male, used as weapons in dangerous fights. This qualitative result, that a small value of the future promotes dangerous fighting, has also been found using more elaborated game theory models than the Hawk-Dove game (e.g. Enquist and Leimar, 1990; Leimar et al., 1991).

## 经济代写|博弈论代写Game Theory代考|Lethal Fighting

Hawk-Dove 游戏是一种高度理想化的动物竞蹇模型，但它对某些情况的描述相当好。因此，它可以成为高度危险的战斗的合理模型，其代价是重伤甚至死亡。 $A\left(p^{\prime}, p\right) V+S\left(p^{\prime}, p\right) W_{0}$ ， 在哪里 $A\left(p^{\prime}, p\right)=\frac{1}{2}\left(1-p^{\prime}\right)(1-p)+p^{\prime}(1-p)+\frac{1}{2} p^{\prime} p$ 是突变体赢得比塞的概率， $S\left(p^{\prime}, p\right)=1-\frac{1}{2} p^{\prime} p$ 是它在比寋中幸存下来的 概率，并且 $W_{0}$ 是突变体末来的徽殖成功，因为它能够存活下来。因此
$$W\left(p^{\prime}, p\right)=W_{0}+\frac{1}{2}(1-p) V+\frac{1}{2}(V-p C) p^{\prime},$$

## 有限元方法代写

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## MATLAB代写

MATLAB 是一种用于技术计算的高性能语言。它将计算、可视化和编程集成在一个易于使用的环境中，其中问题和解决方案以熟悉的数学符号表示。典型用途包括：数学和计算算法开发建模、仿真和原型制作数据分析、探索和可视化科学和工程图形应用程序开发，包括图形用户界面构建MATLAB 是一个交互式系统，其基本数据元素是一个不需要维度的数组。这使您可以解决许多技术计算问题，尤其是那些具有矩阵和向量公式的问题，而只需用 C 或 Fortran 等标量非交互式语言编写程序所需的时间的一小部分。MATLAB 名称代表矩阵实验室。MATLAB 最初的编写目的是提供对由 LINPACK 和 EISPACK 项目开发的矩阵软件的轻松访问，这两个项目共同代表了矩阵计算软件的最新技术。MATLAB 经过多年的发展，得到了许多用户的投入。在大学环境中，它是数学、工程和科学入门和高级课程的标准教学工具。在工业领域，MATLAB 是高效研究、开发和分析的首选工具。MATLAB 具有一系列称为工具箱的特定于应用程序的解决方案。对于大多数 MATLAB 用户来说非常重要，工具箱允许您学习应用专业技术。工具箱是 MATLAB 函数（M 文件）的综合集合，可扩展 MATLAB 环境以解决特定类别的问题。可用工具箱的领域包括信号处理、控制系统、神经网络、模糊逻辑、小波、仿真等。

assignmentutor™您的专属作业导师
assignmentutor™您的专属作业导师